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The decision issued by the three-judge panel of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in the matter of 
Hunter v. Hamilton County Board of Elections2 contains a very interesting analysis of problems 
with Ohio’s law about counting provisional ballots when they are cast in “the right church, 
wrong pew” (RCWP).3 
 On the whole, the appeals court opinion contains a strong argument against the Draconian 
effects of the Ohio law, which allows — indeed, mandates — disenfranchisement of voters who 
have followed the instructions of a poll worker. 
 However, the decision makes what appears to be an empirically questionable assumption 
in its footnote 24, which reads as follows: 
It is also discomforting that Ohio’s rule that all provisional ballots cast in the wrong 
precinct must be excluded may fall—at least in this instance—unevenly on voters 
depending on where the Board directs them to vote. In single-precinct polling places 
there is less room for error than at the multiple precinct locations that have caused so 
much difficulty in this case. As a result, fewer provisional ballots are likely to be counted 
in multiple-precinct polling places than in those that serve only a single precinct.  This 
disparate impact might not be of constitutional significance everywhere in Ohio, but here 
Plaintiffs assert that “the polling places where most of the error-infected provisional 
ballots were cast are in African-American areas of Hamilton Country.” Plaintiffs 2d Br. 
at 3. It appears, then, that the exclusionary rule in this case may accrue to the detriment of 
a protected class. (Emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
1 Department of Political Science, MIT, Cambridge MA 02139. E-mail:  cstewart@mit.edu 
2 http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/11a0021p-06.pdf 
3 “Right church, wrong pew” refers to the problem that occurs when a voter goes to a physical voting location that 
contains multiple precincts and casts a (provisional) ballot in the wrong precinct, even though the correct precinct is 
also at the same location where the voter cast the (provisional) ballot.  Under the Ohio law at issue, the voter must 
cast the ballot in the correct precinct; even an egregious error by a poll worker directing a voter to the wrong 
precinct is insufficient to make an exception. 
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 The italicized sentence proposes a hypothesis that provisional ballots will be rejected 
more often in multi-precinct polling places than in single-precinct polling places.  This 
hypothesis suggests the possibility that Ohio’s policy of rejecting RCWP ballots produces 
disproportionate effects in minority and non-minority communities.   
A direct test of the footnote 24 proposition is possible, though not provided in the 
decision.  It is not clear whether direct evidence on the point was given at trial.    However, it is 
possible to test the general proposition, at least at the county level.   
When we examine this proposition with the best data we have for the 2008 election, it 
turns out to be only weakly supported.  However, in the process of examining the proposition 
that multi-precinct polling places lead to the greater use and rejection of provisional ballots, we 
come up against the more important empirical pattern, the considerable discretion exercised by 
local election officials in the implementation of election laws.   
As far as the 2008 election is concerned, counties with more multi-precinct polling places 
were no more likely to provide provisional ballots than those with fewer.  When measured in 
terms of voters (rather than in terms of counties), voters in counties with more multi-precinct 
counties were somewhat more likely to see their ballots rejected, but the variability around this 
relationship is so great that it is clear that even if multi-precinct voting locations are a problem, 
there are bigger factors than simple polling place chaos. 
 The data for this analysis are taken from the Election Assistance Commission’s 2008 
Election Administration and Voting Study (EAVS).4  The EAVS contains considerable data 
about election administration, reported at the county level.  For the 2008 presidential election, 
the EAVS asks the following of each county:  (1) the number of physical Election Day polling 
                                                 
4 http://www.eac.gov/research/election_administration_and_voting_survey.aspx 
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locations, (2) the total number of precincts, (3) the number of provisional ballots cast, and (4) the 
number of provisional ballots rejected. 
 The logic of my (very simple and crude) analysis proceeds as follows.  First, if multi-
precinct polling places lead to more confusion about which precinct a voter should cast a ballot 
in, then we should expect more provisional ballots to be cast in counties that have more multi-
precinct polling places.  Second, if multi-precinct polling places lead to confusion, then a higher 
rate of provisional ballots will be rejected in these precincts.  On this second point, it is unclear 
which is the correct denominator to use in calculating the rejection rate — should it be as a 
percentage of all voters or just those who cast provisional ballots?  Therefore, I examine both.  
(While the two denominators arise from different theories about what problem we are worrying 
about when we examine the rejected provisional ballot rate, in practice, the two measures are 
highly correlated [r = .80] at the county level in Ohio.) 
 In addition, there are two ways to generate correlations in analyses such as these.  One 
can either treat all counties as equal, or one can weight each by a variable such as turnout.  The 
former analysis may allow us to focus on counties as distinct administrative units, each of which 
is held to a common standard regardless of how large it is.  The latter analysis allows us to focus 
on individual voters, giving greater influence to counties that have larger populations, or more 
experience with the use of provisional ballots (in this case).  I report the results of both analyses 
below. 
 
1.  Ohio counties with more multi-precinct voting locations in 2008 did not issue more 
provisional ballots (as a percentage of in-person voters) than counties with fewer multi-
precinct voting locations. 
 
4 
 
I first look at the relationship between the percent of ballots cast provisionally and the use of 
multi-precinct polling locations.  For this analysis, the denominator for the dependent variable is 
the total number of ballots cast on Election Day and in early voting.  Figure 1 shows that the 
relationship is unrelated to the number of precincts per polling place.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
The correlation coefficient (r) in this case is .12 when we weight each county equally.  
When we weight them by in-person turnout, r = -.01.  Using the conventional statistical tests, we 
would conclude that these relationships are indistinguishable from zero.  The data point for 
Hamilton County is indicated in the graph (as it is for all the graphs in this research note).  This 
allows us to see that Hamilton County had one of the highest percentages of provisional ballots 
cast, although it is roughly in the middle of counties, in terms of polling place consolidation. 
 
2.  Ohio counties with more multi-precinct voting locations in 2008 may have rejected more 
provisional ballots, but the answer to the question depends on how the rejection rate is 
calculated and whether or not the data are weighted by turnout (or provisional ballot 
usage). 
 
There are two ways to examine this.  The first is to compare the percentage of all provisional 
ballots that are rejected against the previously used measure of multi-precinct voting locations.  
That graph is shown in Figure 2.  The unweighted r = .13; the correlation coefficient weighted by 
the number of provisional ballots cast in each county is .28.  The former correlation is very weak, 
when we ask about statistical significance, but the latter passes the traditional 95% confidence 
interval test.   
[Figure 2 about here] 
The alternative way of measuring the provisional ballot rejection rate is to divide the 
number of rejected provisional ballots by the total number of in-person ballots cast.  Using that 
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measure of the dependent variable, we generate the graph in Figure 3.  The unweighted r = .14; 
the correlation coefficient weighted by the number of in-person votes cast in each county is .13.  
Each of these correlations is very weak, and would not pass the traditional threshold for 
statistical significance.  Thus, at most, there is weak evidence that in Ohio, if a voter is given a 
provisional ballot, it is less likely to be counted in a county with many multi-precinct voting 
locations.   
[Figure 3 about here] 
 Examination of the figures shows a couple of interesting patterns.  First, Hamilton 
County is on the low end of counties in the use of multi-precinct polling places.  Second, 
Hamilton County is close to the mean of all Ohio counties in terms of both provisional ballot 
usage and rejection rates.  Thus, if there are outliers in Ohio, in terms of provisional ballots and 
the RCWP problem, Hamilton County is not the first place to look. 
 Third, the data provide evidence that the large amount of discretion employed by poll 
workers and election officials in the use of provisional ballots.  Note the tremendous variation in 
the use and rejection of provisional ballots.  Across Ohio counties, the use of provisional ballots 
ranged from 1.8% of turnout (Coshocton County) to 8.2% (Franklin).  The rejection rate as a 
percentage of provisional ballots cast ranged from 3.2% (Pike) to 38% (Lawrence).  As a 
percentage of turnout, the rejection rate ranged from 0.1% (Pike) to 1.9% (Adams).  These are 
order-of-magnitude differences that are hard to explain based on demographics alone, although 
the fact that Franklin County (Columbus), with a highly mobile student and young professional 
population, has such a high provisional ballot usage rate suggests that demographics do play a 
part in explaining some of this variation. 
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 Finally, it does not appear that Hamilton County in 2008 had a particularly large RCWP 
problem.  The percentage of provisional ballots rejected because they were cast by a registered 
voter who showed up at the wrong precinct was 21%, compared to the statewide average of 19%.  
The other two largest jurisdictions in Ohio, Cuyahoga and Franklin Counties, had similar 
rejection rates for this reason, 25% and 18%, respectively.  The counties with the highest RCWP 
problems were Lawrence (38%) and Adams (37%), which had the highest rejection rates overall. 
 In assessing this empirical analysis, it is important to keep in mind that it was done at the 
county level using data from the 2008 election.  Things may have been different in 2010 (we will 
know when the EAC releases their 2010 data next fall), and they may have been different if we 
had done the analysis at the precinct level.   
 Although there is, at best, limited evidence that multi-precinct polling places are causing 
provisional ballots problems in Ohio, the best data we have about provisional ballot use and 
rejection illustrate a considerable amount of discretion being exercised at the local level.  As an 
aside, according to the EAVS dataset, 155 provisional ballots were partially counted in Stark 
County, which seems inconsistent with Ohio’s provisional ballot counting laws.  Logan County 
reported one provisional ballot that was partially counted.  All other counties reported either zero 
or did not report any number.  Careful scrutiny of provisional ballot data may demonstrate other 
types of discretion that are not always apparent when we look at election administration one 
precinct at a time. 
The Hamilton County case is a nice anecdote that illustrates a larger pattern that emerges 
when we examine nationwide data about election administration — local election officials do not 
always feel comfortable implementing election laws with Draconian effects.  This leads to local 
officials — county boards and poll workers — making exceptions that are often well meaning, 
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but contrary to law, and potentially producing disproportionate effects.  The degree to which this 
happens in practice is an important field of election administration that has been little researched, 
and therefore rarely addressed when laws passed.  Research by Alvarez et al,5 for instance, has 
suggested that a similar level of discretion is being exercised locally in the implementation of 
voter identification laws — a small fraction of voters (often white women of a certain age) more 
easily get off without showing photo identification in states like Indiana and Georgia that have 
very strict identification requirements.  At the same time, voters of all sorts are being asked for 
photo identification in states that not only do not require photo identification, but also ban the 
use. 
In an era in which policymakers are paying attention to fraud at the polls, something to 
caution against is passing laws and promulgating regulations that local officials will be unable, 
or unwilling, to enforce consistently.  Hard evidence of voter fraud is difficult to come by.  Hard 
evidence of poll worker discretion is easy to come by.  If election administration were as data-
driven as other areas of public administration, one would think that we would be tackling the 
problems related to polling place integrity we know to exist. 
                                                 
5 R. Michael Alvarez,, Stephen Ansolabehere, Adam Berinsky, Gabriel Lenz, Charles Stewart III, and Thad E. Hall, 
2009, 2008 Survey of the Performance of American Elections. Pasadena/Cambridge: Caltech/MIT Voting 
Technology Project. 
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Figure 1.  Provisional ballots issued to voters, as a proportion of all voters, plotted against the 
average number of precincts per physical polling place, Ohio, 2008.  (Source:  EAC, 2008 
Election Administration and Voting Survey.) 
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Figure 2.  Provisional ballots rejected as a proportion of provisional ballots issued, plotted 
against the average number of precincts per physical polling place, Ohio, 2008.  (Source:  EAC, 
2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey.) 
 
 
Hamilton
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
P
ro
vi
si
on
al
 b
al
lo
ts
 re
je
ct
ed
 p
er
 p
ro
vi
si
on
al
 b
al
lo
ts
 c
as
t
0 1 2 3 4
Precincts per physical polling place
 
10 
 
Figure 3.  Provisional ballots rejected as a proportion of all ballots cast plotted against the 
average number of precincts per physical polling place, Ohio, 2008.  (Source:  EAC, 2008 
Election Administration and Voting Survey.) 
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